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AlExtending the Domain of Freedom, or Why
Gaia Is So Hard to Understand
Bruno Latour and Timothy M. Lenton
The Gaia hypothesis implies that the stable state of our planet includes man as part
of, or partner in, a very democratic entity.
—James Lovelock1Ever since Dipesh Chakrabarty opened a Pandora’s box on the defini-
tion of humanity during the Anthropocene, the question of establishing a
new continuity between the domain of necessity (nature) and the domain
of freedom (society) has been raised.2 In this paper we claim that free-
dom, understood as the capacity to obey one’s own laws—that is, auton-
omy—could offer a common ground for ecological politics, on the con-
dition of revising some of the commonly held views of what the concept
of Gaia consists of. To do so, we wish to look in a new way at Gaia as
James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis have proposed it, thanks to research
done in natural and social science since the inception of this concept.
A Common-Sense View That Is Not So Common
The public discourse about the state of the planet is currently in a par-
adoxical situation: on the one hand, everyone involved in the politics of
climate accepts the idea that Earth behaves as a regulated system that hasWe thank the participants at the Fondazione Cini September 2017 meeting “What’s the
Body of the new Body Politic?” in Venice for many useful insights and Bill Brown, Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Bruce Clarke, Sébastien Dutreuil, Dorothea Heinz, Baptiste Morizot, and Simon
Schaffer for their comments on the paper.
1. James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979; New York, 2000), p. 137.
2. Chakrabarty is right that all the difficulties in giving political traction to ecological ques-
tions arise from such incommensurability between long-term geological history and short-term
human history; see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical In-
quiry 35 (Winter 2009): 197–222.
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Albeen dangerously pushed by human action out of its normal conditions
of operation; on the other hand, the hypothesis that Earth is indeed a self-
regulating system remains highly controversial—and most people do not
connect the idea of Earth regulation with Lovelock’s and Margulis’s “dis-
covery” of Gaia. Thus, the common horizon of political action and moral
commitment—Earth is a system put out of whack that should be brought
back inside some form of order through the regulation of human activity—
remains a local and disputed intellectual and scientific idea.
The reason for this paradox is that the Gaia theory has either been em-
braced with too much enthusiasm or rejected with too much scepticism,
both without unpacking its exact content. No wonder, as order and regu-
lation are terms that pertain jointly to science and to politics. Those for
whom it is obvious that there is some order in the regulation of the Earth,
as well as those for whom it remains a vague metaphor, might not have
zoomed in on the precise ways through which Gaia was introduced. No
matter if they come from philosophy or from science, they seem to have
pigeonholed the argument to suit their preconceptions of how nature is
supposed to rule, rather than being sensitive to the originality of the phe-
nomena offered for inquiry.3 The result is that half a century from its in-
ception, it is still hard to find a widely shared definition of Gaia.
There are of course good reasons for that. The first is that any new
phenomenon is defined by comparison with some already familiar situa-
tion. Gaia however is a unique phenomenon—at least as long as we have
no proof of another planet modified by life to provide some sort of base-
line. So, it’s no wonder that metaphors don’t help much in defining Gaia:
if you are happy with one version, it is sure to be wrong. You cannot zoom
in on its specificity by just considering nature as a whole. Hence the many
misunderstandings accumulated over the years around the idea that the
Earth is alive, that it is an organism, a superorganism, a machine, a cyber-
netic feedback control device, a spaceship, a body politic, and so on. Even
the tamed notion of system is no more than a fragile simile, in spite of the
now common expression Earth System Science (ESS)—the polite euphe-3. See for instance how the philosophical work of Michael Ruse, The Gaia Hypothesis: Sci-
ence on a Pagan Planet (Chicago, 2013) and the scientific work of Toby Tyrrell, On Gaia: A
Critical Investigation of the Relationship between Life and Earth (Princeton, N.J., 2013) include
Lovelock’s Gaia into a holistic view without trying to understand its originality.
Bruno Latour is an emeritus professor associated with Sciences Po médialab.
Timothy M. Lenton is professor of climate change and Earth system science
and director of the Global Systems Institute at the University of Exeter.
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Almism sometimes used to avoid naming Gaia too directly.4 While there
is a fairly widely held perception that ESS has replaced the idea of Gaia,
we argue it is important to differentiate them. Specifically, Gaia originated
and expanded in space and time from within a preexisting Earth system.
Strangely, defining such a phenomenon requires a sort of negative geology
reminiscent of the apophatic ways that theologians had recourse to when
trying to probe God’s uniqueness.5
The second reason for the difficulty of making sense of Gaia is that it’s
not clear if it’s a discovery of a new phenomenon or the introduction in
science, as well as in philosophy, of a new way of looking at all phenom-
ena on Earth. As Sébastien Dutreuil has shown in a meticulous inquiry
into its historical development, Gaia is simultaneously a hypothesis, a test-
able theory, a summary of highly specific facts, a worldview, and a philos-
ophy of nature all mixed together.6 Not to mention the claim made by
some of its proponents that it might be a new religion or a new spirituality.
This uncertainty explains the wide range of reactions triggered by any ut-
terance of the word Gaia.
It is the aim of the present paper not to choose too fast what Gaia con-
sists of because we claim that Lovelock’s and Margulis’s discovery might
be just as unique as the object it tried to describe. In other words, Gaia
might be the name of a shift in understanding how to approach many
phenomena previously lumped together in the notion of nature. This is
why we are—one coming from social science and the other from natural
science—joining forces to keep open the possibility that we are dealing
with a change in what could be called a worldview, by which we mean a
distribution of traits affecting science as well as politics, morality, and the
arts. In brief, a cultural paradigm shift, comparable in scope to the one
introduced at the time of the scientific revolution by Galileo Galilei.
It is actually this shift in worldview that justifies our use of Gaia un-
apologetically in what follows—not in spite of but because of its mytho-
logical baggage. Even though many scientists have preferred ESS because
it avoids any connection with mythology and the problem of evolution-
ary theory, we believe that Gaia is a distinct phenomenon and, because of4. See Tim Lenton, “Home,” Earth System Science: A Very Short Introduction (New York,
2016), pp. 1–17.
5. See Etienne Gilson, La Philosophie au moyen âge: De Scot Erigène à G. d’Occam (Paris,
1925).
6. See Sébastien Dutreuil, “Gaïa: hypothèse, programme de recherche pour le système
Terre, ou philosophie de la Nature?” (PhD diss., University of Paris 1, 2016) and, for an En-
glish summary, “James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis: ‘A New Look at Life on Earth’ . . . for
the Life and the Earth Sciences,” in Dreamers, Visionaries, and Revolutionaries in the Life Sci-
ences, ed. Oren Harman and Michael R. Dietrich (Chicago, 2018), pp. 272–88.
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Alits several meanings, maintains some of the radicality necessary to make
both science and society tackle the new “climate of history.”7 Although it
has strictly the same etymology as geo, when it is used as a prefix in words
like Gaia-logy, Gaia-graphy, Gaia-chemistry or Gaia-politics, Gaia focuses
attention on the uniqueness of the situation at hand—a uniqueness that
we believe has not attracted enough scrutiny.8 What the prefix geo down-
plays or ignores, Gaia forces us to underline again.
Gaia Theory Is Contemporary to the Anthropocene
To fathom Gaia’s uniqueness, it is convenient to reflect first on the his-
torical situation in which its formulation came about. It was so peculiar
that it would be a mistake to try to establish too much continuity between
Gaia and earlier views of the balance or harmony of nature. The idea was
born in a setting marked by the explosion of wholly new technical and
industrial infrastructure. Not only was its formulation strictly contempo-
rary with what was later called the Anthropocene, but, in addition, its first
description by Lovelock depended fully on an analysis of how human in-
dustry had been able to modify the chemical balance of the Earth at a
global scale.9
As has been told many times by Lovelock and described by Dutreuil in
great detail, the invention of exquisitely sensitive instruments—especially
the electron capture detector—allowed Lovelock to quantify the extent of
industrial pollution in a new way. His inventions were used to detect the
global spread of anthropogenic pollutants, including DDT and later CFCs.
And it was Lovelock’s resulting reputation for instrument design that led
NASA to employ him in the design of life detection experiments for what
were to become the Viking missions to Mars. As is well known, Lovelock
puts his Eureka moment of discovering Gaia in 1965, while he was work-
ing for NASA at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California.10
In many ways, his insight to look at the Earth as if from Mars was to ex-
tend to all life forms the analogy that their disseminations of chemical by-
products were like those of modern factories.
In brief, Gaia was discovered through a level of human technology and
the self-awareness of the planetary consequences of that technology, which7. See Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History.”
8. Actually, as one of us has shown elsewhere, Gaia carries a lighter and more secular bag-
gage than the highly complex and multilayered notion of nature; see Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia:
Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, trans. Catherine Porter (Medford, Mass., 2017).
9. See Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene: The
Earth, History and Us, trans. David Fernbach (New York, 2016).
10. See Lovelock, Homage to Gaia: The Life of an Independent Scientist (New York, 2001).
This content downloaded from 144.173.009.049 on June 17, 2019 01:32:53 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2019 663
Alcoincided with the start of what has been called the Great Acceleration—
one of the dates chosen for the beginning of the Anthropocene.11 So, if the
concept of Gaia is unique, it is largely because it was born in the middle
of the extraordinary ambiance of the postwar high-technology boom and
space missions.12 It can almost be said that, conceptually, the idea of the
Anthropocene precedes Gaia, even though, obviously, when the long his-
tory of the planet is told, the Anthropocene is portrayed as no more than
a short episode within the deep history of Gaia.
Such an original birth might explain why the search for predecessors
does not help much in clarifying the innovation. Several attempts to ori-
ent Gaia within preceding traditions of scientific thought have been fairly
misleading. Gaia is not continuous with older ideas of the balance or or-
der of nature. It is true that Lovelock credits James Hutton’s idea that the
Earth is like an animal that repairs itself as an inspiration.13 But what Hut-
ton was describing was the cycling of sedimentary rocks, without any par-
ticular agency for life or any real notion of history except endless cycles.
As we discuss below, his choice of an animal metaphor—a crude reuse of
the old image of the body politic—is wholly inappropriate for Gaia.
Even though Margulis was fond of seeing Vladimir Vernadsky as a fore-
runner, Lovelock has never agreed with this, and we concur. While Ver-
nadsky brings all life forms within one homogeneous sphere—the bio-
sphere—he gives them no agency whatsoever, such that any organism
could be replaced by any other.14 Furthermore, this system has no more
history than Hutton’s.15 Historians are fond of continuity and of discover-
ing precursors, and it is often true that Alexander von Humboldt or Ver-
nadsky read like Lovelock, but, as is well known, precursors are often dis-11. See Colin N. Waters et al., “The Anthropocene Is Functionally and Stratigraphically
Distinct from the Holocene,” Science, 8 Jan. 2016, science.sciencemag.org/content/351/6269
/aad2622
12. See the remarkable The Whole Earth Catalog: California and the Disappeance of the
Outside, ed. Dietrich Diederichsen and Anselm Franke (exhibition catalog, Haus der Kulturen
der Welt, Berlin, 2013).
13. See Martin J. S. Rudwick, Bursting the Limits of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory
in the Age of Revolution (Chicago, 2005).
14. See for instance at the end of Biosphere: “Life remains unalterable in its essential traits
throughout all geological times and changes only in form. All the vital films (plankton, bot-
tom and soil) and all the vital concentrations (littoral, sargassic, and fresh water) have always
existed” (Vladimir I. Vernadsky, The Biosphere, trans. David B. Langmuir [New York, 1998],
p. 149).
15. Perhaps the closest forerunner to Gaia is Alfred Redfield’s work on the “biological
control of chemical factors in the environment,” which at least grasps a cybernetic view
where living agents maintain conditions preferable to them; see Alfred C. Redfield, “The Bio-
logical Control of Chemical Factors in the Environment,” American Scientist 46 (Sept. 1958):
205–21.
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Alcovered only after their successors retrospectively shine a new light on dis-
coveries that once had a different meaning.
By contrast with those precursors, the novelty introduced in the notion
of Earth by the joint efforts of Lovelock and Margulis consists in granting
historicity and agency to all life forms, that is, in attributing to the life forms
themselves the task of creating the conditions for lasting in time and ex-
panding in space. It is in that sense that they can be said to obey their own
laws. What is especially telling is that Lovelock and Margulis succeeded in
doing so because they took on the problem of the planet at opposite scales—
the largest planetary view for Lovelock and the oldest and smallest cellu-
lar view for Margulis.16 In doing so, they established a clear break with
older notions of the order and regulation of the planet.
Earlier notions of nature were always situating life forms inside a larger
frame. Whatever the name given to such a frame—God’s providential dis-
pensation, neo-Darwinist natural selection, strictly mechanistic laws of
nature, ecological systems, biosphere—it was from this larger frame that
life forms found their limits and their definitions. They were not supposed
to generate their own world, or to participate in anything like a history.
Strictly speaking, life forms had no real agency compared to the frame that
determined the order of nature. But with Lovelock’s and Margulis’s Gaia
there is no other order, and certainly no order superior to what those inter-
twined agents have been producing through their entanglements.17 This is
why we believe that the best way to clarify such a shift in worldview con-
sists in resisting the addition of any supplementary frame. To be sure, as we
shall see, there is an order in Gaia that has political consequences, but it is
not the same conception of order implied by the previous concept of na-
ture divided from that of society. Such is the line we will follow in the rest
of this essay.
Using All Means Available to Trace a Portrait of Gaia
The uniqueness of the concept explains the multiplicity of versions
given by Lovelock through his long writing career, a multiplicity that, to
be fair, accounts for some of the confusion. His hesitations go so far that16. A connection well summarized by Lynn Margulis and Gregory Hinkle: “The conclu-
sion is inescapable: geophysicists and atmospheric scientists must study biology and biologists
must know something of geophysics and atmospheric science. For too long, we have had at-
mospheric chemists wondering ‘Where does all that methane come from?,’ and biologists
ignorant of ‘Where all that methane goes’” (Lynn Margulis and Gregory Hinkle, “The Biota
and Gaia: 150 Years of Support for Environmental Sciences,” in Scientists on Gaia, ed. Stephen
H. Schneider and Penelope J. Boston [Cambridge, Mass., 1991], p. 12).
17. See Latour, “Why Gaia Is Not a God of Totality,” Theory, Culture and Society 34,
nos. 2–3 (2017): 61–81.
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Alhe often presents Gaia as an intuition, an invention, which defies linear
logical description. He explicitly likens his realization of Gaia to his process
of inventing technological instruments, which achieve their desired func-
tion but without any explanation about how precisely they work.18 Al-
though this appeal to technical invention instead of scientific explanation
seems puzzling, it is actually essential for understanding the shift he is try-
ing to express.
Mechanistic explanations do not look at all the same as a worldview
when proposed by scientists as they do by philosophers or when inventors
use them to describe the act of invention. It appears that inventors are well
aware that no mechanism behaves in a mechanistic way when it is brought
into the world. Something else is at work—another mode in which agency
and history counts.19 Lovelock’s insistence on opposing engineering and
academic science explains the ways he simultaneously multiplies, discards,
and then combines metaphors in order to approximate the originality of
the phenomenon at work.
Although Gaia is often portrayed as a complex system, specifically as a
complex adaptive system,20 this broad category fails to distinguish some of
its unique features. As an engineer/inventor, Lovelock naturally reaches for
cybernetic language to describe the workings of Gaia, such as feedback, ho-
meostasis, self-regulation, and optimization.21 But he equally reaches for bi-
ological language to describe the perceived entity and its functioning, such
as super-organism and geophysiology. All the while, Margulis explicitly and
repeatedly reminds him that Gaia is not an organism.22 In addition, as a
past medical researcher with an extraordinary personal history of medical
issues (and thus a great admiration for good doctors and nurses), Lovelock18. “I am an inventor. I find it easy to invent a self-regulating device by first imagining it
as a mental picture. . . . In many ways Gaia, like an invention, is difficult to describe’’ (Love-
lock, Gaia: The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine [New York, 2000], p. 11).
19. See John Law, Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience (Durham, N.C.,
2002). See also the telling example of biologists at work on the tertiary structure of proteins
in Natasha Myers, Rendering Life Molecular: Models, Modelers, and Excitable Matter (Durham,
N.C., 2015).
20. See Simon A. Levin, “Self-Organization and the Emergence of Complexity in Ecologi-
cal Systems” BioScience 55 (Dec. 2005): 1075–79.
21. This problem is tackled by Bruce Clarke, “Neocybernetics of Gaia: The Emergence of
Second-Order Gaia Theory,” in Gaia in Turmoil: Climate Change, Biodepletion, and Earth
Ethics in an Age of Crisis, ed. Eileen Crist and H. Bruce Rinker (Cambridge, Mass., 2010),
pp. 293–314. See also Earth, Life, and System: Evolution and Ecology on a Gaian Planet, ed. Clarke
(New York, 2015).
22. See Clarke, “Gaia Is Not an Organism: Scenes from the Early Scientific Collaboration
between Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock,” in Lynn Margulis: The Life And Legacy of a Sci-
entific Rebel, ed. Dorion Sagan (White River Junction, Vt., 2012), pp. 32–43.
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Alis also drawn to physician’s language when he speaks of “planetary medi-
cine” even though he might dismiss such a comparison later.23
The main point in this constant shuffling of images is to avoid the con-
nection between a mechanism and the idea that there is a machine in the
traditional sense, that is, one built by some engineer situated above and
in addition to the invention. Lovelock is at pains to make clear that Gaia
is not a spaceship; that would imply an engineer or a designer exterior to
Gaia, a move that would immediately reaffirm the presence of some sort
of purpose or teleology—not to say providential theology. This is why he
constantly has to fumble with slightly contradictory images in order to
avoid using just one of them.
It is crucial to understand that to combat the dangers of the mecha-
nistic metaphor neither Lovelock nor Margulis can rely on the main tra-
ditional alternative, that of organism. If the idea of a machine at the scale
of the planet has no meaning—in case of a mechanical failure of the Earth
system there is no Cape Kennedy and no Houston to turn to—the absur-
dity is even greater if the notion of organism is inflated to the size of the
Earth. No matter how tempting it is to lump all life forms into one huge,
unified, and continuous biosphere of some sort, or to invoke a superor-
ganism, any idea of a giant composite planetary body should be resisted as
much as the myth of the machine. Those who project onto Gaia the image
of a global body, or even worse that of a female body, simplify Lovelock
and Margulis’s common project.24 And it is certain that they are not aware
of Gaia’s mythical pedigree. Any look at Hesiod will show that there is
nothing maternal, womanly, or even godly in such a dangerous, archaic,
cunning, and chthonic figure that precedes all the gods.25
Even if Lovelock had succumbed to the metaphor of the organism, he
would have been redressed by Margulis’s own long fight against any idea
of individual isolated life forms anyway. This is where the collaboration be-
tween the two coinventors is so important and under-recognized. Not only
does Margulis bring a knowledge of biology and deep time to the concep-
tual innovation that Lovelock does not possess, but she makes impossible
any use of a simplified version of an organism that could reside inside an
environment that would be exterior to its history. Margulis’s own discov-
eries and insights—a topic that has becomemore andmore mainstream in23. See Lovelock, Gaia: The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine.
24. Nothing shows that better than Margulis, “Gaia Is a Tough Bitch,” in The Third Cul-
ture, ed. John Brockman (New York, 1995), pp. 129–46.
25. Especially useful is Jean-Pierre Vernant, introduction to Hésiode, Théogonie: La
Naissance Des Dieux, trans. Anne Bonnafé (Paris, 1993). For more references, see Latour, Fac-
ing Gaia, pp. 81–83.
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Alrecent years—make it impossible to separate any life form from its outside
and impossible to take it as an atomic entity within its own distinct bound-
aries.26 “Holobionts” cannot be invoked to play the role of organisms sub-
mitted to a natural selection whose history would be forced upon them.
This is where the main difference with neo-Darwinism lies and the rea-
son why both discoverers of Gaia ran into trouble at first with so many
biologists.27 While Darwinian organisms don’t have to create the situation
in which they find themselves, Lovelockian agents have to take on their
shoulders, so to speak, the task of bootstrapping the very environment
into which they fold themselves. Natural selection for Lovelock appears
as a simplified and on the whole local way to account for life forms’ en-
gineering capacity; for Margulis, on the other hand, natural selection is
not even a creative process but rather just the culling of “unfit” variations.
To be sure, this constant shuffling of contradictory metaphors inter-
fering with one another is confusing, but it’s not a reason to dismiss the
theory or to focus on one of the many images the authors proposed. It
just means that Lovelock and Margulis have been struggling to find the
right way to approach a new historical situation on which they, and the
rest of the planet, were embarked.28 To do so, they had no other way than
to make use of all means available, just as other scientists have done when
faced with the problem of describing a major paradigm shift.
Actually, this offers a clear parallel with Galileo’s efforts at describing
falling bodies.29 These hesitations prove that in the same way that it is dif-
ficult to invent Galilean objects, it is just as hard to dis-invent them in or-
der to repopulate the Earth with what could be called Lovelockian or Mar-
gulisian agents.
Why Gaia Is Not an Organism
Given the explosion of new knowledge available from ESS, it is no won-
der that none of the usual metaphors worked. It is clear today that Gaia26. See the recent textbook in this paradigm Scott F. Gilbert and David Epel, Ecological
Developmental Biology: The Environmental Regulation of Development, Health, and Evolution
(Sunderland, Mass., 2015), and the recently released film Symbiotic Earth: How Lynn Margulis
Rocked the Boat and Started a Scientific Revolution (dir. John Feldman, 2017). See also
Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (New York, 1998).
27. See Dutreuil, Gaïa for what amounted to a complete clash of paradigms: what life is
for Lovelock and Margulis is not what life is for, let’s say, Richard Dawkins.
28. Two recent books summarize best the new situations where conceptions of organisms,
evolution, and politics are being simultaneously modified; see Donna J. Haraway, Staying
with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham, N.C., 2016), and Anna
Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capi-
talist Ruins (Princeton, N.J., 2015).
29. See H. J. Schellnhuber, “‘Earth System’ Analysis and the Second Copernican Revolu-
tion,” Nature 402 (Dec. 1999): C19–C23.
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Alcould not possibly have been considered an organism for at least three rea-
sons.
The first is the level of exterior resources Gaia depends on to survive.
If Gaia is clearly not like an animal, it’s because animals are heterotrophs,
meaning that they feed on organic matter, whether alive or dead. This is
the reason why comparisons of Gaia to literally any kind of body, be it the
Earth mother, an animal, or a body politic, cannot be anything but wildly
inaccurate metaphors. In technical terms, Gaia is autotrophic, meaning that
it makes itself out of inorganic materials, or more accurately photoautotro-
phic as it is powered by sunlight. However, Gaia cannot be compared to a
plant, alga, or cyanobacterium because those are open systems continually
exchanging matter and energy with their surroundings. In contrast, Gaia is
nearly a materially closed system, with minimal matter exchanges between
the inner Earth and space but with a vast degree of internal recycling.30
This is another difference with the Darwinian formulation of nature in
which organisms are continually interacting with other organisms in their
environment, as well as continually exchanging materials with their out-
side. Gaia is not interacting with other Gaias. While any organism has an
environment, strictly speaking Gaia has no environment except itself, if by
environment we mean what with which any entity engages in a reciprocal
relation. To be sure, the rest of nature can be said to reside “around Gaia”
but only from an astronomical point of view of someone residing in outer
space. Viewed from the inside of Gaia, the rest of the universe is simply
beyond the outer limits of its system. Properly speaking, Gaia resides inside
itself.
The second reason why Gaia cannot be compared to an organism is that
it has no homogeneous internal milieu. In other words, not only does it
not have an outside, it does not have a coherent inside either. It is that sort
of heterogeneity in the many cycles that have been discovered over the
years that makes the idea of a homogeneous biosphere so misleading. Shy-
lock was sure of killing Antonio by carving “a pound of flesh,” but Gaia
does not have such a unity that extracting a pound of life would kill the
whole. It has no whole in the way an animal body is whole.31 This is what
makes the question of deciding if it is alive or not especially moot and why
it does not make much sense to defend or to attack the belief that the Earth
is alive.30. For perhaps the most comprehensive source on this point, see Tyler Volk, Gaia’s
Body: Toward a Physiology of Earth (New York, 1998).
31. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. Jay L. Halio (New York, 2008),
p. 180.
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AlThe question of what is alive and what is not in Gaia is so hard to pin-
point that some solid mineral forms are directly produced by life (bio-
mineralization), some are indirectly due to life because they rely on the
oxygenation of the atmosphere, and some are fully abiotic. Similarly, some
gases are uniquely biogenic (isoprene, dimethyl sulphide), many others
have their abundance massively altered by life, and some do not interact
with life (noble gases). In other words, Gaia is very much a patchwork and
not a unified domain, sphere, region or entity. Depending on which chem-
ical cycle you consider, you will have to pass through a long chain of living
forms or none at all.32
The main point is that in Gaia the cycling of materials through the in-
termediary of life forms will vary enormously depending on their biolog-
ical function (or lack of it). For the six most important elements for life
(carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, sulfur), most of the mat-
ter being cycled has passed through a life form—in some cases many times.
For other biologically essential elements, the intensity of cycling will vary,
to use an economic metaphor, according to the balance between the de-
mand made by life forms and the supply of nonliving elements. Even in
cases when the aggregate requirement of all life is comparable to the phys-
ical and chemical supply (such as calcium from weathering and erosion),
there is still considerable biological control of the cycling. In general, the
more we discover about biochemistry, the more the list of elements for
which there is no biological requirement dwindles. For those still on that list
are not generally cycled through life except by accident. This is the case for
noble gases for which there is no cycling at all. So this nuance of different
degrees and types of cycling does not fit a monolithic conception of Gaia.
The third reason why Gaia is not an organism is the disconnect between
the immense amount of energy falling on Earth that activates its enor-
mous machinery and the tiny but distributed amount that life forms have
been able to piggyback on. We always tend to forget that only a small frac-
tion of the total energy (electromagnetic radiation) being absorbed at or
near the Earth’s surface and powering the climate is captured by a life form
and converted to electrochemical form (although in parts of the visible
spectrum the fraction captured by life is significant). This energy flux into
life is readily dwarfed by the energy fluxes of the great heat engines of the
atmosphere and ocean. The Earth absorbs roughly 120 petawatts of solar32. For a general overview, see Lenton and Andrew Watson, Revolutions that Made the
Earth (New York, 2011). For more specialized references see Lenton and Stuart J. Daines,
“Biogeochemical Transformations in the History of the Ocean,” Annual Review of Marine Sci-
ence 9 (2017): 31–58 and “Matworld—The Biogeochemical Effects of Early Life on Land,”
New Phytologist 215 (July 2017): 531–37.
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Alradiation; for example, the heat flux carried by the Gulf Stream alone is
approaching one petawatt. That is an order of magnitude bigger than the
roughly 0.1 petawatt captured by life forms.
Nevertheless, living agents use this tiny fraction of the free energy flux
to extraordinary effect, creating material cycles, altering the chemical com-
position of the atmosphere, creating aerosols and cloud condensation nu-
clei, and thus profoundly affecting the energy balance of the planet and the
climate. This suggests that the particular utilisation of free energy by life,
notably in information storage and processing, gives it unusual agency rel-
ative to abiotic climate processes. In a way, we should consider that Gaia is
folded, distributed, and inserted inside an Earth system that existed long
before its development and will persist long after its demise, and that life
has learned to modify but only partially. The result of this disconnect is
that any portrait of Gaia is difficult to stabilize. If you look at energy trans-
fer, life is barely visible; but if you look at the amount of new information
and the fluxes of key biological elements, Gaia is everywhere and has mod-
ified the whole system —except it is not a “whole system.”
Those three sets of scientific facts are what make the uniqueness of Gaia
so difficult to portray. Far from looking like a biosphere added to other
spheres, Gaia appears as a reticular, lacunar, dappled, distributed sort of
entity for which there is no precedent nor comparison possible. The allu-
sion we made above about a negative or apophatic way of portraying Gaia
is clearly not a cop-out; it is the only way to first tackle what the topic re-
quires. And that explains why Lovelock had to resort so often to a some-
what mysterious way of speaking of Gaia as a nonlinear sui generis inven-
tion—a solution that had the unfortunate consequence of nurturing a
magical “soft” view of a mystical Gaia very far from the hard-nosed fully
reductionist view of science that Lovelock was also pursuing. Lovelock
and Margulis did not overanimate a dead earth for some mystical reason;
they simply refused, for strictly scientific reasons, to deanimate it, that is, to
deny the agency of life forms.33 Although it’s true that Gaia requires a spe-
cial effort from science, neither Lovelock norMargulis entertained the idea
of an alternative, more intuitive and superior Gaian science.
There Is One Gaia but Gaia Is Not One
The difficulty of approaching the uniqueness of Gaia is visible not only
when one considers the many heterogeneous ingredients mobilised by its
cycles but also when the bewildering heterogeneity of the processes re-33. That Gaia, for this reason, is the first fully secular and nonprovidential figure of life;
see Latour, Facing Gaia, pp. 75–145.
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Alsponsible for those cycles is taken into account. This is a point that was
not so clear in the seventies, but it has been increasingly emphasized by
the various results coming from ESS. In all of the discussions about Gaia
that either reject or embrace it too quickly, it has always been implied that
Gaia has a wholeness and an integrity that it does not in fact possess. While
those could have been adjectives applied to nature, they don’t work for
Gaia. Or rather, wholeness and integrity are exactly the key questions im-
plied by older philosophies of nature and thrown into doubt by the dis-
covery of Gaia.
One could ask, if such a wide distribution of mechanisms is true, then
what is the sense of invoking the name of Gaia at all, as if it had, through the
use of a personal name, some sort of unified character? But this would
again be a way to skip what the discovery is about: even though life forms
are not submitted to a frame that would be superior to them, they do pro-
duce such a frame, or more exactly they generate as many frames as their
intertwined history has locally produced. In other words, the reason why
any notion of whole has to be put into question is because life forms pro-
duce their own extension in space and time. If there is one thing that we
should not apply any a priori form of space and time to, it is the way life
forms extend and last. A Kantian view of space and time is not applicable
to Gaia.
That Gaia makes its own (changing) boundaries in space and time is
shown by the fact that the spatial extent of life’s influence has changed over
time, reaching farther down into the Earth’s crust and farther up into the
atmosphere.34 Furthermore, the temporal extent of life’s influence is in-
ternally determined—by altering its own survival probability or collective
persistence—to the extent that some studies suggest an Earth that had
never had life would have undergone the runaway greenhouse fate of Ve-
nus by now; that is, it would have left what astrophysicists describe as the
“habitable zone” around the sun, where liquid water is present.35
In a different sense, the spatial boundaries of Gaia are somewhat de-
pendent on the temporal scale of consideration. Thus, when considering
the short-term response to perturbations such as human fossil fuel burn-
ing, only interactions among the atmosphere, ocean, and life matter, but34. “Life has had a profound effect on surface geological processes, and even on modulated
tectonics and the rise of continents. . . . The net effect is Gaian . . . ; that is, life has modified
Earth to its net advantage” (Norman H. Sleep, Dennis K. Bird, and Emily Pope, “Paleontology
of Earth’s Mantle,” Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences 40 [May 2012]: 293). We
thank Bruce Clarke for this reference.
35. See Lenton and Werner Von Bloh, “Biotic Feedback Extends the Life Span of the Bio-
sphere” Geophysical Research Letters 28 (May 2001): 1715–18.
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Alwhen considering the longer-timescale response to perturbations, we have
to examine exchanges with the crust and sedimentary rocks. When consid-
ering the response to geological drivers and the slow brightening of the sun
on geological timescales, we also look at the cycling of materials through
sedimentary rock reservoirs in the crust.
To reveal these important aspects, we need to break apart the unity and
homogeneity of Gaia. We need to somehow show that Gaia is a heteroge-
neous phenomenon created by the actions and interactions of many di-
verse biological free agents and aspects of their abiotic world, the result
of which is a risky and provisional extension in space and duration in time
(fig. 1).
Paradoxically, although as we noticed above Earth system is often taken
as a synonym of Gaia, Gaia is distinct from the Earth system and not
strictly speaking a system—certainly not one system. As we explained ear-
lier, this is why the concept of Gaia is distinct from the concept of ESS,
which grew out of it. While ESS remains as close as possible to physics
and chemistry, Gaia absorbs as much of biology and ecology as possible.
It is as if the second were folded into the first in multiple ways. Although
ESS can be defined and described in terms of a Carnot heat engine, Gaia can-
not because it continually creates its own domain and behavior through
information and evolution, that is, through some sort of learning. What
is observable is only the relative success of life forms in extending in space
and lasting slightly longer in time—no more and no less. There is no guar-
antee of its continuity—no destiny superior to that of the life forms them-
selves. In a parody of Hutton we could say that in Gaia “we find many
vestiges of a beginning and many prospects of an end.”36
The best way to understand this lack of unity is to consider that Gaia is
a heterarchy with variations in the strength of coupling between the liv-
ing and nonliving across spatial and temporal scales and across different
features (nutrient cycling, climate). A look at figure 2 will show the vast
diversity of mechanisms depending on the scale of time and space (fig. 2).37
It is clear that there are variations in the type and strength of selection
mechanisms that can arrive at and refine properties such as cycling and
stability at different time and space scales. Nutrient (re)cycling is partic-36. See James Hutton, “Theory of the Earth; or an Investigation of the Laws Observable
in the Composition, Dissolution, and Restoration of Land upon the Globe,” Transactions of
the Royal Society of Edinburgh 1, no. 2 (1788) 209–304. The phrase with which he invented the
notion of Earth as a cycle of material (“no vestige of a beginning,—no prospect of an end”)
ends the paper (p. 304).
37. See Lenton et al., “Selection for Gaia across Multiple Scales,” Trends in Ecology and
Evolution 33 (Aug. 2018): 633–45.
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Alularly strong at localized scales (for example within a forest) and can be
understood as refined and reinforced by forms of conventional natural se-
lection. Natural selection has also refined an amazing level of homeostasis
for some organisms (such as human body temperature regulation), but
such homeostasis is not detectable at the same level of coupling, at other
scales. In contrast, global climate on long timescales appears less strongly
regulated because it is understood to have arisen by simpler mechanisms.
First it is a simple principle that unstable configurations (in this case of the
coupling between living things and the climate), should they arise, will not
tend to persist, whereas stable configurations, when found, tend to persistF I G U R E 1 . Items defined by the test: biotic and abiotic planets.This content downloaded from 144.173.009.049 on June 17, 2019 01:32:53 AM
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Al(“sequential selection” in figures 1 and 2). Second, that very persistence,
combined with the incessant innovation accompanying the evolution of liv-
ing agents, gives a greater chance of acquiring further persistence-enhancing
properties (“selection by survival” in figures 1 and 2).38
This is not the place to develop the argument, but it is clear that no un-
derstanding of Gaia is possible without breaking down its spurious unity
and making clear which of the many phenomena composing it are being
pointed out. We argue that so many people have misunderstood Gaia be-
cause they have chosen one scale and generalized to all the others. Such a
multiplicity of processes cannot be lumped into one coherent entity even
though coupling provides some sort of overall order. It is this contradic-
tion that is at the heart of Lovelock’s and Margulis’s discovery: there is one
Gaia, but Gaia is not “a whole.”F I G U R E 2 . Space and timescales of Earth and Gaia processes. Some key Earth system
processes, feedback mechanisms, and regulated variables (N, P, CO2, O2) are shown as black
dashed ovals. Selection and self-organization mechanisms are shown as gray shaded ovals.38. See W. Ford Doolittle, “Darwinizing Gaia,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 434 (Dec.
2017): 11–19.
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AlIt is in this sense that the notion of Gaia is so different from that of
nature. When Earth was understood as a set of Galilean objects obeying
laws of nature, it had a consistency, a homogeneity, a continuity that Gaia
entirely lacks. The domain of necessity that could be opposed to that of
freedom was entirely made up of Galilean objects generating what René
Descartes called res extensa. But if you try to compose the planet out of
Lovelockian or Margulisian agents, it has a completely different feel. When
scholars attempt to oppose life (biological life) with life (moral and social
human life), they imply a form of unity and of continuity fitting for the
idea of nature but ill-adapted to the specificity of Gaia.39 In consequence,
human agents don’t have the same role to play whether they reside “in na-
ture” or see themselves as participating in Gaia. This is where the notions
of order and regulation take a different political meaning.
The Tyranny of the Globe
In our view, this new conception of Gaia should modify political con-
cepts on both sides of the older division between nature and society. Un-
fortunately, the traffic of images between biology and politics has been
going on for so long that it is very difficult to extricate from its embrace
a unique phenomenon such as Gaia.40
If it is difficult to focus on Gaia, it is because any appraisal of a body in
an environment is immediately confused with, not to say kidnapped by,
the metaphor of the globe. And it is true that when you pretend to con-
sider Gaia as a whole you immediately summon the image of the “blue
planet” viewed from outer space—in addition to an ample circular ges-
ture of the two hands. But no matter how powerful the influence of such
an iconic photograph, no matter how often you agitate your hands, the
impulse to globalize should be resisted because nobody who claims to
have “a global view” actually resides in any real space. They imagine them-
selves as if they were looking from the outside at the Earth taken as one
body among all celestial bodies, just as Galileo did. The global view is
strictly speaking a view from nowhere—or from an office looking at a com-
puter screen.39. See, for example, the confusing idiom of zoe and bios resurrected in Chakrabarty,
“The Human Condition in the Anthropocene,” The Tanner Lectures in Human Values, Yale
University, 18–19 Feb. 2015, tannerlectures.utah.edu/Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf
40. See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978–
1979, trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Michael Senellart (New York, 2008), and Evelyn Fox Keller,
Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines
(Cambridge, Mass., 2003).
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AlThe difficulty of abandoning such a position is compounded by the
confusion between the cartographic globe and the rich artistic repertoire
of older symbols of ancient Roman and Christian dominion.41 The sym-
bol of orbis terrarum held by the emperor or by God is certainly not the
best way to recognize the limited, entangled, highly complex and lacunar
forms of Gaia. In addition, and to render the situation even more inex-
tricable, any allusion to the global is immediately fused with a social and
political metaphor of the body politic. To see the polity as a big organism
made of parts obeying the dictates of the whole will be conjured at once
in every description of order and system.
To combat such confusion, we should recognize that Gaia is not a globe
at all but a thin biofilm, a surface, a pellicle no more than a few kilome-
ters thick that has not made inroads very far up in the atmosphere nor
very far down in the deep earth below, no matter how long you consider
the history of life forms. This is why it is important to shift from the global
vision of Gaia to what some scientists now call the “critical zone.”42 Such a
critical zone, because it does not have any way of being summed up in one
classical image of the globe, resists being immediately fused with a view of
the planet viewed from the outside.43 What Galileo succeeded in doing—
establishing the Earth as just one body among all of the other bodies in the
infinite universe—the critical zone decomposes: Gaia requires a new situ-
ation for the observer as well as for what is observed. In addition, the great
advantage of the critical zone is that it does not fit at all in any metaphor of
the globe held in the hand of a God, a prince, or an emperor. There is no
dominion to be exerted at all when the idea of Gaia as a thin biofilm is
introduced into the picture. Nothing rules anymore above the life forms.
It’s in that sense that we propose to say that those life forms literally make
their own laws.
This is why it is so important to extract Gaia from being immediately
lumped in with a social and political idea of the body politic.44 The reason
is again that the metaphors of organism and superorganisms have been
used to solve the question of the relations between parts and whole, that41. See Peter Sloterdijk, Globes, vol. 2 of Spheres (Cambridge, Mass., 2014).
42. See Susan L. Brantley, Martin B. Goldhaber, and K. Vala Ragnarsdottir, “Crossing
Disciplines and Scales to Understand the Critical Zone,” Elements 3 (2007): 307–14, and
Brantley et al., “Designing a Network of Critical Zone Observatories to Explore the Living
Skin of the Terrestrial Earth,” Earth Surface Dynamics 5 (Dec. 2017): 841.
43. See Alexandra Arènes, Latour, and Jérôme Gaillardet, “Giving Depth to the Surface—
An Exercise in the Gaia-raphy of Critical Zones,” The Anthropocene Review 5, no. 2 (2018):
120–35.
44. See Emanuele Coccia, The Life of Plants: A Metaphysics of Mixture (Medford, Mass.,
2019).
This content downloaded from 144.173.009.049 on June 17, 2019 01:32:53 AM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Critical Inquiry / Spring 2019 677
Alis, to distinguish a frame from what is being framed just as much in bi-
ology as in sociology.45 To talk of Gaia as one organism is to suggest that
organisms are, on one level, parts and, on another level, some whole that
has distributed roles and functions to the parts. This is what is called the
organicist view, beautifully summarized in the fable of The Members and
the Stomach.46 The idea that there are two levels does not change much
when you suggest that the parts, defined as so many individual agents,
once they interact, generate what are called emergent properties, a meta-
phor summarized admirably in Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees
(1705) and associated with a “liberal” view. Although the two sets of im-
ages seem very different politically, they actually obey exactly the same
pattern because they resort to two levels. In both cases—in both fables—
there is a whole superior to the parts, either a whole before in the organ-
icist view or a whole after the interaction of the agents in the liberal view.
The problem is that those ubiquitous metaphors amalgamating social,
physical, political, economic, and biological visions break down when ap-
plied to Gaia. And this is again where the Lovelock and Margulis collab-
oration is so important: the idea of parts and whole does not make much
sense in Margulis’s definition of holobionts—indeed in any definition of
life forms—because every element is simultaneously the whole and a part
of the whole.47 For Gaia, to speak of a system above and beyond the parts
makes no sense—whether you use a mechanical, cybernetic, or biological
metaphor—and to appeal to the notion of emergent properties so as to
cross the distance between the levels of the parts and the level of the whole
would be a cop-out.
In the same way that Gaia is autotrophic, it is also a phenomenon sui
generis, that is, it generates itself in a unique ad hoc way. That we have no
good concepts to describe this situation is a proof that we relied too much
on the usual repertoire coming from older amalgamations of political and
biological order. To extricate Gaia from such history, we should find a
way to say that the whole is not above the parts but is in continuity with
the parts—the word part being a way to name rather clumsily how ele-
ments are overlapping with one another.48 This is what was true in the ear-
lier somewhat romantic descriptions of Gaia as a whole. It’s true that it can-45. This is in keeping with the principles of methods in social theory offered in Latour,
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York, 2005).
46. See Shakespeare, Coriolanus, ed. R. B. Parker (New York, 2008).
47. See Raymond Ruyer, Neofinalism, trans. Alyosha Edlebi (Minneapolis, 2016).
48. See Gabriel Tarde, Monadology and Sociology, trans. and ed. Theo Lorenc (1895; Mel-
bourne, 2012); and Latour et al., “‘The Whole Is Always Smaller Than Its Parts’: A Digital
Test of Gabriel Tarde’s Monads,” British Journal of Sociology 63, no. 4 (2012): 590–615.
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Alnot strictly be composed of parts sitting—as philosophers say, partes extra
partes—side by side, just like Galilean objects used to do, waiting to be
framed, explained, moved, possessed by laws of nature. It does not mean
that “everything is connected” but that Lovelockian agents have different
ways of being intertwined. It is in that sense that Lovelock’s and Mar-
gulis’s discovery of Gaia should play havoc on the age-old commerce be-
tween social and biological metaphors. The sociobiology of Gaia could not
be the same as the sociobiology based on earlier definitions of the natural
world.
Conclusion: An Extension of the Domain of Freedom
By this attempt at portraying Gaia as it cannot possibly be (the apo-
phatic way), we might have shed light on the essay’s epigraph. At first sight,
it might seem counterintuitive to expect a lesson on democracy from an
author known for his contrarian and even reactionary views on a number
of issues regarding human politics. However, what we are interested in are
his contributions to what could be called the politics of nonhumans.
The uniqueness of Gaia opens a new definition of a polity just at the
time when the situation summarized by the term Anthropocene reopens
the connection between what philosophers used to call the domain of ne-
cessity—that is, nature—and the domain of freedom—namely, politics and
morality. It would be odd, indeed, not to consider the new climatic re-
gime as an occasion to draw new connections between the two domains.
Drawing lessons from nature to define the order and regulation of society
has been going on for as long as political thought. The question raised by
Lovelock’s and Margulis’s Gaia is whether those lessons change when the
two domains are being symmetrically challenged. Does it make a differ-
ence to draw lessons from nature or from Gaia?
If history is a good guide, the specter of naturalization is sure to trigger
in social scientists and those in the humanities a recoil of horror, and
rightly so. It’s enough to remember social Darwinism, sociobiology, dia-
lectic materialism, eugenics, the intelligence quotient (IQ) controversies,
or for that matter much of economic science that purports to make hu-
man societies “obey the laws of nature.” Against those attempts at order-
ing and regulating humans in the name of nature’s “iron cage,” the do-
main of human freedom should be protected at all cost. On the other
hand, the new climatic regime obliges us to revise such a reaction because
the situation is now upside down; it is the Earth that now has to be “pro-
tected at all cost” against the encroaching of human (dis)order and (de)
regulation. So, the Anthropocene puts political philosophy in a double bind:
we should not expect nature to dictate human behavior, and yet we canThis content downloaded from 144.173.009.049 on June 17, 2019 01:32:53 AM
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Alno longer abstain from drawing lessons from the Earth’s behavior because
of the way it reacts to human behavior. So far, discussions about the
new political role humanity should play has not be able to escape from
such a quandary.49
Because Lovelock’s and Margulis’s Gaia, in our rendering of their the-
ory, grants agency and historicity to all life forms, the situation might now
be opened again because it is cracked on both sides of the ancient dichot-
omy between necessity and freedom. That is the novelty to be addressed
and the chance to be seized. When humans look at Gaia, they do not en-
counter the inflexible domain of necessity but, strangely enough, what is
largely a domain of freedom, where life forms have, in some extraordi-
nary ways, made their own laws, to the point of generating over eons mul-
tiple, heterogeneous, intricate, and fragile ways of lasting longer in time
and extending further in space—nothing more, nothing less.
Conversely, any human trying to situate himself or herself as part or
participating in this history can no longer be defined only as “free” but,
on the contrary, must be defined as being dependent on the same sort of
intricate and intertwined events revealed by Gaia.50 More freedom in the
domain of necessity is fully matched by more necessity in the domain of
freedom. This is what is meant by this extraordinary expression of being
“part of, or partner in, a very democratic entity.” To play on Aristotle’s
famous saying, democracy is an expression designating an entity com-
posed of all the political animals, that is, all the beings taken as people
(demos in Greek) making their own laws and who do not simply fall into
any sort of preordained order or obey any superior transcendent regula-
tion.
It is for this reason that it is so important to define as precisely as pos-
sible the contribution made to this extended democracy by the discovery
of Gaia; instead of replaying one more episode in the frustrating attempts
at naturalizing human conduct, Gaia opens the possibility of extending the
domain of freedom by sharing it more widely on both sides. If Roquentin
had held such a view in the canonical scene of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea,
he would not have vomited on the root of the tree, horrified by the totally
senseless and superficial feeling of freedom to which he was condemned
by his opposition to the equally senseless piece of wood.51 Nor do we pro-49. See Clive Hamilton, Defiant Earth: The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene (Malden,
Mass., 2017).
50. See Lenton and Latour, “Gaia 2.0: Could Humans Add Some Level of Self-Awareness
to Earth’s Self-Regulation?” Science, 14 Sept. 2018, science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6407
/1066
51. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York, 2013).
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Alpose that he feels suddenly some sort of effusion by becoming part and
parcel of the evolution of trees. We just propose to suggest that they both
share the feeling of freedom placing life forms at a distance from one an-
other but not the distance that used to paralyze humans and nature: rather,
the wary, puzzled, enigmatic, and shifting distance polities have always en-
tertained with one another.52 One additional advantage would be to offer
an alternative to the word ecology and to help scientists and activists to col-
laborate around what could be simply called politics of life agents.52. This distance has been fine-tuned by Baptiste Morizot, Les Diplomates: Cohabiter avec
les loups sur une nouvelle carte du vivant (Marseille, 2016), and Coccia, The Life of Plants, but
no social scientist did it more radically than the novelist Richard Powers in The Overstory
(New York, 2018).
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